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In early December 2008 Athens, and subsequently a number of other Greek 
cities, were gripped by a series of demonstrations and riots which shocked 
Greeks, and many beyond. What was more shocking than the mere eruption 
of the demonstrations was their duration, their spread throughout Greece 
and the fact that they were accompanied by acts of looting, violence and 
ultimately terrorism. Ostensibly, the cause of these mass and violent protests 
was the shooting of teenager Alexis Grigoropoulos, by a trigger-happy police 
officer. But what quickly became apparent was that the demonstrations that 
ensued, both the violent and the more peaceful ones, were more of a 
manifestation of a longer-term sense of frustration on the part of elements 
of Greek society, especially the youth, than simply a short-term feeling of 
outrage at the killing of a school-age child. 
 
The main grievances of the demonstrators were directed at a political system 
and state behaviour which Greek youths believed had let them down. This 
was not only about reform of higher education or youth unemployment and 
dim job prospects. It included anger directed against the perceived incapacity 
and unwillingness of the established political parties to provide change and 
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reform; endemic corruption throughout the political and judicial system; an 
inadequate police force; and many other factors.  
 
The government of the day, ‘the state’, as well as the police force were the 
initial targets. But rapidly, banks and other big businesses were seen as 
legitimate targets for the demonstrators. Among the demonstrators were 
also a significant representation of Greece’s anarchist and extreme left 
movements, quick to turn the situation to their advantage and refocus the 
riots into an anti-establishment, anti-systemic, anti-capitalist movement. This 
in turn unleashed greater levels of violence not only against the police but 
also against public and private property. Combined with the initial decision 
for the police to adopt an ‘observer’ approach to the demonstrations, partly 
as a means to avoid the further spread of violence, this dynamic soon moved 
from destruction into looting.  
 
With the inability of the mainstream parties to understand and relate to the 
demonstrations – and with the obvious failure of the state institutions 
(including the police) to respond to and control the situation – for at least a 
short period of time in December 2008 it seemed as if there was going to be 
no end to the violence and discontent. Indeed, the protests continued for 
many weeks, now including demonstrations organised by trade unions, 
pensioners and other social groups. And when the scale and force of the 
demonstrations started subsiding, a new wave of guerrilla-style attacks, 
aimed at the police as well as at various businesses, political offices and other 
institutions, started emerging. Politics, it appeared, had returned to the streets – and 
away from the Parliament, outside which stood twice the largest burning 
Christmas tree in Europe.  
 
Besides the obvious issues that these events raise – about governance, 
security and social justice among others – the ‘December Riots’ also raise 
wider questions that are vital to understanding the future of Greek politics 
and society. And while the immediate causes of the demonstrations are clear, 
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the deeper underlying issues remain still unfocused. What social pathologies 
and institutional incapacities allowed the deep causes of these events to 
remain subdued until recently – and to come to the surface so violently and 
so abruptly in December 2008? Are the dynamics underpinning them unique 
to Greece or do they form part of a broader social malaise in the European 
context? Do they represent a social transformation that has already taken 
place – perhaps unnoticed by the mainstream institutions, including the 
political elites and the media? Do they signify a permanent disconnect 
between mainstream politics and society (‘the public’)? And what will be the 
mark that these events will leave on the conduct of mainstream politics and 
on the political process more generally in Greece? Will they ultimately lead 
to a transformation of political parties (or of the political system more 
broadly) and of processes of social representation and engagement? How 
will they shape the social and political horizon in the years to come?  
 
 
The Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics wants to 
encourage a broad and open dialogue on these issues. One of the main 
ambitions of the Observatory is to act as a facilitator for the exchange of 
ideas and views. We encourage constructive research and debate on issues 
relating to contemporary Greece in a frank and open manner. As such we 
invited a group of analysts and commentators, academics and journalists, to 
share their views with us and you so as to create a basis for opening such a 
dialogue. We encouraged the authors to think long-term and to examine the 
deep roots of what happened in December. Our reason for initiating this 
exchange is not ideologically or politically driven: we would like to 
encourage a transparent debate to achieve a better understanding of the 
December events in Greece. The return of this form of street politics has 
certainly left its mark on contemporary Greece and may also do so in 
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Street Protests in ‘Une Société Bloquée’ 
Kevin Featherstone, Professor, London School of Economics, UK 
 
The global economic crisis that began in 2008 was slow to reach Greece. 
The riots that erupted in Athens in December had causes that stemmed 
largely from specifically Greek factors. As such, they cannot easily be taken 
as the harbinger of popular protest across Western economies in crisis. They 
do, however, raise important questions about governance and cohesion in 
Greek society that can be expected to linger for the foreseeable future. The 
response will indicate much about the capacity of Greek society to engage in 
serious reform. 
 
The tragic shooting of a 15-year old schoolboy unleashed the most 
widespread violent protests of the Metapolitefsi (Greece post-1974). The 
protests soon questioned the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state 
authorities. The popular protests led many schoolchildren to engage in strike 
action, with the connivance of at least some of their teachers. Children, 
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some not yet in their teens, were convinced the authorities were lying and 
were having their first experience of industrial-style unrest.  
 
These uncontrollable events were followed by a spate of small-scale terrorist 
attacks across Greece. Cash machines were wrecked, cars smashed, and 
bombs placed outside banks and police stations. After the success in 
arresting the ‘November 17’ (N17) terrorist group some years earlier, it 
seemed anarchist protests were back.  
 
Alongside a sociological agenda of alienation and threat, came a ‘Hollywood’ 
escapade that was lifted right out of a joke book with the escape from a 
maximum security prison of Vassilis Paleokostas. The sense of farce was 
compounded by the fact that he had escaped in exactly the same way – 
climbing a ladder to an overhead helicopter - less than two years previously. 
The state authorities were humiliated. 
 
Social breakdown was matched by a government in disarray. The political 
fallout began with a Cabinet reshuffle and a lead in the polls for PASOK, 
the main opposition party, though perhaps not big enough to overcome the 
earlier seepage of its own voters to fringe parties. Public opinion had turned, 
though it remained indecisive: Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, still 
remained more popular than PASOK’s George Papandreou. 
 
The immediate outcome of these events has to be placed in the context of 
the deeper social tensions within Greece that pre-date them. The riots 
unleashed a pent-up frustration of the youth over the ineptitude and 
indiscipline of the police. This same group had parallel grievances over the 
lack of jobs, the changed employment contracts, and low incomes on offer 
to them. This was probably the first generation of the Metapolitefsi to face 
worse economic prospects than its predecessors. 
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Yet, these protests connected with a sense of malaise in wider society. The 
‘system’ was not delivering opportunity to the young, but also it was failing 
in other respects. The political landscape had for some time been formed by 
the conflicting, and often irreconcilable, demands of various social groups, at 
least some of which had the power to slow or even veto change. At the 
political apex was a system of government that lacked structural power and 
efficiency. Government purpose has been repeatedly undermined by the 
conflicting needs of clientelism and, often also, the distractions of 
corruption. Ministers intent on serious reform face political isolation as 
other interests come into play. At the same time, the voice of the unions has 
been dominated by the interests of workers in the public sector: the very 
part of the system most often attacked for its inefficiency and corruption. 
On the other side, the economy has very few large firms and a myriad of 
small enterprises. Traditionally, many large firms have opted for social peace 
in the context of sustained barriers to market entry. The constituency for 
liberal economic reform has been exceptionally small and shallow. 
 
Thus, Greece has exhibited low reform capacity on a long-term basis. The 
explosion of protest in December 2008 added an intense focus on the 
policing functions of the state to a condition of unmet economic and social 
demands. A system that cannot process competing social demands to satisfy 
rising expectations is a blocked society. The latter exhibits a party system 
lacking loyalty and support; a system of interest mediation that tends 
towards conflict and stalemate on key issues; and a governmental structure 
that lacks the ability to sustain singularity of purpose and implementational 
strength. In this context, a sudden focus on an underlying area of frustration 
can unleash a popular explosion with which the system is barely able to 
cope. At the same time, the political and social conditions – with their 
inherent conflicts and contradictions - make it difficult for the protesters to 




Greece at the start of 2009 seemed to approximate these conditions in 
important ways. The immediate social crisis had abated, but the mood was 
of unprecedented gloom and uncertainty. Public debate awaited the next 
national elections, with an assumption that they could redress the situation. 
Yet, whether this proved so would depend on the more fundamental 














The New Politics of  the New Century 
Othon Anastasakis, Director of SEESOX, University of Oxford, UK 
 
In December 2008, Greece surprised the world with the intensity of its 
youth rioting and the extent of destruction of property in various Greek 
cities. For this state of affairs there have been many explanations and 
significant degree of blame. The first natural target of these demonstrations 
was the police, blamed for its brutality, but also its incompetence and 
inability to protect the citizens from the generalised anarchy that prevailed. 
The second target was the government for its inability to give proper 
guidance to its security forces, but also for a more general lack of leadership. 
The other political parties did not escape criticism either, blamed for their 
lack of political alternatives and their ineffective opposition. The education 
system has been criticised for being inefficient, disconnected with current 
needs and uncompetitive in the international market, creating big numbers 
of under- or un-employed graduates. As a matter of fact, the state of 
education has been one of the most sensitive matters and the recent 
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attempts by the government to introduce reform met with fierce resistance 
from students.  
 
In the background, lies the current economic crisis which is deep and has 
affected the people’s mood, and their pockets. People’s anger has been 
directed towards the government for its inadequate economic policies but 
also the bankers for their share in the current financial crunch. For the more 
internationally minded, the blame lies with the uncontrollable forces of 
global capitalism which result in economic inequality, environmental 
disasters, illegitimate international military interventions and the weakening 
of nation states and governments. Finally seen from a conspiratorial 
perspective, not uncommon in Greek minds, the blame lies with external 
agents and secret forces, who instigate disorder and plot against Greece’s 
national interests. 
 
The list of grievances is long and some of the arguments are more 
convincing than others. It is, however, important to note that these issues 
have been in the public domain long before the December 2008 riots and 
reflect the general mood of frustration and dissatisfaction in the country. 
The public climate in Greece has been one of alienation from the political 
establishment, scepticism towards reform (of the pension system, higher 
education, employment policies, agricultural sector etc.), and disdain towards 
instances of political corruption. Public demonstrations, and the violence 
attached to them, have become a regular pattern in Greek politics. When 
demonstrations take place in Greece, and particularly in Athens, a parallel 
network of ‘professional rioters’ appear on the scene and test their ability to 
cause havoc. The December riots were particularly severe, widespread and 
destructive because they started with a very provocative trigger i.e., the 
shooting of an upper-middle class pupil by police forces, which brought 
about a big reaction from the most sensitive, protected and ‘adored’ part of 
the society i.e., the pupils (and was handled in the most ill-conceived and 
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disorientated way by the police and the government, which allowed ample 
space for the violent rioters to destroy and loot). 
 
The December 2008 riots, the ones preceding them and the ones that 
follow, signify two interesting phenomena for Greek (and international) 
politics. First, more and more dissatisfied and frustrated citizens and groups 
of citizens resort to protest politics which is butter on the bread of the 
‘professional rioters’, and second, the ideological message of these protests 
and unrest is multi-thematic and is addressed to different audiences.  
 
Democratic politics are becoming more direct and protest politics are 
beginning to gain ground over the more traditional forms of political 
participation, i.e., electoral politics, party membership, trade unionism, 
strikes etc. These conventional democratic channels are not convincing 
enough to represent the different demands because they are seen as corrupt, 
inefficient and out of date. People do not feel that by changing their national 
governments they will make any significant difference. Apart from 
mistrusting politicians, they realise that real power of decision has been 
transferred to regional and global levels, the European Union or global 
international institutions, outside and beyond national borders. In that sense, 
Greece, and its violent reaction to the crisis, is not a uniquely national 
phenomenon, it can occur and, indeed, happens in many other countries that 
are going through similar crises.  
 
Demonstrations have always been part of Greek culture and there have been 
plenty of riots in the past on issues that could unite large groups of 
individuals and social classes. Yet, in most of these cases popular reaction to 
the political process was mono-thematic and concrete. During the 1960s, 
popular reaction attacked the authoritarian state, its divisive policies and its 
one-sided, exclusionary ideology; during the 1970s, the popular demand was 
for the democratisation and the opening of the political system, the fight 
against the legacy of the Greek civil war and the military junta; during the 
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1980s, the popular claim was for the redistribution of the national product 
and the inclusion of social and political forces that had been excluded for 
long; during the 1990s, the main messages were the ‘modernisation’ of the 
Greek economy and society, the inclusion of Greece into the single currency 
and the projection of the country as a regional power in South East Europe.  
 
The first decade of the 21st century has multiple messages to deliver, and a 
lot of anger to channel; there are many demands addressed at both national 
governments and international global agencies. Greek popular reaction is 
targeting political corruption, economic crisis, the state for its inefficiency 
and its poor capacity to deliver, the police for its brutality and incompetence, 
the bankers for their financial responsibility, the European Union for 
imposing unpopular reforms, and globalisation for the socio-economic 
inequality and the world injustices that it brings. Paradoxically, these 
protesters and ‘professional rioters’ who fight against globalisation are also 
gaining global appeal for their anti-capitalist, anti-global, even anarchist 














The Society of  Aphasia and the Juvenile Rage 
Olympios Dafermos, Advisor at the Pedagogic Institute, Greece 
 
So much juvenile rage! So much indignation and the adult society has still to 
consider the causes of this panhellenic revolt, to examine its development 
and the framework within which the rage and despair of the children was 
born. 
 
Universal Malfunction of Institutions 
Wherever young people turn they face emptiness. The main objectives today 
are injudicious consumerism, the pretence, the menacing threat of television 
and the acquisition of power and wealth. Creative people and those who 
work arduously are neither acknowledged nor remunerated. Today’s 
commercialised society emphasises the present, moving forward with no 
plans, values, ideologies, solidarity, collective actions or prospects.  
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The average young person is forced to study in a miserable school, long-
lasting and boring, which ignores contemporary theories of learning and new 
educational methods. Simultaneously he is forced to attend tutorial courses if 
he wants to continue his studies at university level. During his adolescence 
he is forced to work hard all day long. He is not given any time to fall in 
love, to see and experience the world. He has no time to play, no time to 
waste, in order to find himself, to think and to organise his own sense. If he 
is good at learning by heart he will enter higher education, where yet another 
shock awaits. The university, in crisis, augments his confusion rather than 
aiding him in his personal organisation. 
 
Upon his graduation, he faces unemployment, partial or seasonal 
employment, derisory wages, uninsured work, companies that rent workers, 
and labour insecurity, in general. The private sector treats youth as 
‘expendable products’. 
 
In the political firmament the situation is worse still: scandals, corruption 
and political impotence. The politicians are anything but exemplary. Without 
positions and programmes they seek to achieve power by all means.  
 
Exclusively benefiting professional politicians and affiliated parties, the 
political system finds itself in complete crisis. ‘Relatives’ and Vatopedio, 
looting of public fortune, political spin, lack of political dialogue, and 
absence of substance or responsibility are the cause and, ironically, the only 
remnant of the system. 
 
In the state mechanism, corruption, clientelism, bureaucracy and inefficiency 
prevail. Public services treat the youth contemptuously: often they are 




Despite political and moral decline there is no cry of distress from the 
intellectual leadership. There are no intellectuals today to fundamentally 
criticise the authorities, to demonstrate a people-centred and socially judicial 
path. Those who are not pursuing their fifteen minutes of fame are using up 
their energy on EU funded projects. There are exceptions, but they are few 
and far between and the media does not consider them worthy of attention 
 
The judicial system and the church also showed a side similar to that of 
politicians: corruption, cynical authoritarianism, a lack of social and ethical 
or moral sensitivity. Finally the media are firmly embedded to the power 
establishment that supports it directly and indirectly. 
 
Neoliberal politics function in an unregulated way without promising 
anything to the dominating parties. They attack the workers and the weakest, 
and are in need of repressive mechanisms. It is no coincidence that the 
peremptory police officers are rarely punished. The impunity and the 
authoritarian education are the producers of the audacious murderers, like 
those of Alexis Grigoropoulos, the torturers of immigrants etc. 
 
The Left Wing 
Today’s Left Wing is in complete crisis from all angles. This does not allow 
it to constitute a vision or to conceive new movements, much less express 
them. This crisis led the traditional European Socialist parties to adopt a 
neo-liberalistic policy, resulting from: 
a) the collapse of Soviet regimes, which indicated universal defeat across the 
Left Wing;  
b) globalisation, which restricts the interventionist capacity of the state both 
economically and legislatively; 
c) the introduction of new technologies in production, which decreased the 
weight of the working class in the economy and in employment relations. 
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Although SYRIZA is receptive, it is unable to express the movement by 
giving content and solutions for its shortcomings. By helping it to form its 
own demands and slogans, it could lead to an action and behaviour without 
antisocial characteristics, as it is the case now.  
 
The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) does not exercise Opposition. It 
mainly attacks SYRIZA and PASOK apprehending/fearing that they will 
absorb its voters. In this way it lines up with the New Democracy 
Government, while often its positions coincide with the reactionary views of 
parties that do not belong to the left. Its presence and its actions do not 
influence the country’s politics. Possessed from existential anxiety, it is 
found in the margin of political life, entrenched in Stalinism and its 
authoritarian organisation. Although its military type demonstrations may 
not bring about trouble, they do not constitute a political fact. The fact that 
it does not begin with its own initiative is interpreted by conspiracy theories. 
Consequently, it cannot comprehend the autonomous juvenile movement of 
December. Even more, it cannot express it, which leads it to another type of 
action and behaviour. In fact, this movement threatens the Communist Party 
(KKE) and its conservative policy. 
 
The Movement 
The young people, who attempt to see and experience the world and face 
the void, have been mobilised for years through demonstrations, 
occupations and demands. The state and society are ignorant; the system 
legislates by default and against them. The main concern of adults is their 
convenience, even at the expense of the future of the country and of young 
people. 
 
Harsh neo-liberal policy, the decay and the faceless left create a gloomy 
present and a dangerous future. The average young person faces, beyond the 
impasse of life, the impasse of the crisis of ideologies, values and visions. 
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For these reasons, the movement of the youth was expressed blindly, with 
rage and sometimes anti-socially, without demands and slogans; destroying, 
symbolically, the world of adults.  
 
All young people, and those that wear hoods, were produced by the society 
of the adults. They are not monsters, neither ‘spoiled’, nor criminals, but 
rather hypersensitive individuals, notably hurt from the world of adults, 
from which they have not received love, acceptance and respect. The cold 
blooded killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos threatened their physical existence; 
hence the explosion and the rage towards the callus authorities. This is what 
they received, this is what they return. We are the moral perpetrators. 
 
Let us admit that today, while the society of adults trails in the wake of 
events, young people resist. They destroy, which is why we disagree with 
them. But doesn’t neo-liberalism, and its international policies, cause 
destruction? Crude military interventions, the legitimacy of tortures, looting 
of the countries of the South, increase in the number of children that die 
from hunger, increase in the number of the ‘nouveau-poor’ – a beastly 
situation. This is the framework within which the political power functions 















[Greek riots 2008:] - A Mobile Tiananmen 
Akis Gavriilidis, Translator - PhD in Law Philosophy  
 
The first error we must avoid when trying to make sense of the riots that 
shook Greece in December 2008 is to explain them away as an ‘emotional 
outburst of the youth’, or as ‘blind violence with no political content’. Such 
views were expressed by many Greek analysts and politicians and not only 
from the mainstream. For example an article entitled ‘The Politics of 
Speechlessness’ appeared in Avgi on 1 March 2009. 
 
In contrast, I maintain that this movement was extremely eloquent and had 
everything to do with communication. Admittedly not in the Habermasian 
sense, but at least in two other senses. Firstly, rioters used modern 
technologies of communication, in ways that outwitted the state’s archaic 
mechanisms. The coordination of high school students, when they 
simultaneously attacked about 45 police stations all over Greece without any 
central leading body, was a masterful display of organisational skills 
 16 
desperately lacking from most state agencies. Secondly, the riots themselves 
constituted a statement (or several statements); this statement was a 
performative one, in so far as its subject did not pre-exist its formulation, but 
was produced by the very act of enunciation. 
 
At the same time, this subject is just as much a non-subject (if by ‘subject’ we 
understand a unified and accountable entity). It is a multiple subject: it is 
neither ‘the youth’, nor the ‘working’ or the ‘middle class’. To be sure, most 
of the rioters are in – or alternate between - one or more of these statuses. 
But they never invoked any of these as an essentialist and exclusive source, 
as the ‘ultimate reason’ of their revolt. Unlike the traditional leftist labour 
and/or anti-colonial movements of the 20th century (the century of Fordism 
and imperialism), these people did not mobilise to demand higher salaries, 
better education, or national independence and sovereignty. The object, as 
well as the tool, of their struggle was not just communication but life itself. As 
capital turns into sources of profit, the communicative, linguistic and 
affective skills of people, their very mobility, these same skills increasingly 
become also tools of resistance1.  
This subject is the multitude.  
 
According to the traditional Marxian scheme of revolution, within human 
societies certain productive forces keep accumulating for some while, until a 
moment comes when these forces cannot be contained any more in the 
existing framework of production relationships which used to govern them 
until then. So revolution is the eruption of these forces who could not find 
expression in the old forms. 
 
One could usefully try to construe this movement in terms of Marx’s 
concept, but with at least one differentiation: this eruption of the new forces 
                                              
1 Paulo Virno 2004, A Grammar of the Multitude. For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, 
Semiotext(e), available at http://www.generation-online.org/c/fcmultitude3.htm (March 
2009). 
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onto the scene did not consist of taking control of state power, but only in 
subtracting oneself from its control. It was an exodus from established authority, 
both moral and intellectual, and a performance of this new subjectivity, an 
affirmation of its autonomous existence and dignity. The multitude did not 
come up with a new project alternatively to organise the social totality and 
replace the old framework; it only demonstrated, albeit temporarily, its 
superiority to it. 
 
Accordingly, we could apply to it, and to the embarrassment it caused to 
established politicians and analysts, some words written by Giorgio 
Agamben in respect of the Tiananmen square sit-in:  
 
‘What was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May was 
the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands (…). In the 
final instance the State can recognise any claim for identity –even that of a 
State identity within the State (…). What the State cannot tolerate in any 
way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming 
an identity that humans co-belong without any representable condition of 
belonging. For the State, therefore, what is important is never the singularity 
as such, but only its inclusion in some identity, whatever identity (but the 
possibility of the whatever itself being taken up without an identity is a threat 
the State cannot come to terms with)’2.  
 
A marker of this affirmation (and, at the same time, undermining) of 
identity, was the ‘social poetics’3 concerning the term koukouloforoi [‘the 
hooded ones’], as it was used – and re-contextualised – during the events.  
 
This poetics first of all reappropriated – through its parody – an already 
existing pejorative term and gave it a new, positive meaning, made of it a 
source of pride rather than shame – much in the same way as gays did with 
the term queer. 
                                              
2 The Coming Community, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 2003, pp. 
84-85. 
3 Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-state, New York - London: 
Routledge, December, 2004 (2nd edition), p. 183 ff. 
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But then, also, this new object of identification is the lack of identity itself, the 
void, as the koukouloforos has no identifiable face – he is precisely ‘taking up 
the whatever as an identity’.  
 
Furthermore, the Greek rioters did not limit themselves to camping on a 
square for several days, as the Chinese students did; rather, they staged a 
nomadic-itinerant Tiananmen. Protestors repeatedly stormed Syntagma square, 
then retreated, came back again, appeared in other neighbourhoods – and 
towns – where no demonstrations had ever taken place. 
 
This element of mobility, which was a weapon for this movement, was also 
one of its reasons. Mobility, both in the physical and in the mental sense, 
contributed greatly to the accumulation of intellectual and affective 
capacities with the younger generation. As it did to their self-esteem, and to 
their subsequent refusal to be governed and told what to do by people they 
wouldn’t accept as their superiors who know better – including journalists, 
university professors, and state and party leaders4. Indeed, due to their 
contact with diverse experiences (ranging from the Erasmus programme to 
the European Social Forum held in Athens in 2005), which went beyond the 
relative insulation under which Greek society had lived for many decades, this 
generation were able to break with the ‘cultural intimacy’ of their society.  
 
One possible translation of ‘cultural intimacy’ is that ‘for certain things we 
don’t ask questions’. One of these things was the impunity of policemen, and the 
ungrievability of the deaths that they induce5. Of this idea, the movement 
constituted the performative rejection. 
 
                                              
4 In this sense, it is totally wrong to link these events to the ‘domination of parties’ 
[kommatikokratia] and the ‘weakness of the civil society’, as Nikos Mouzelis did (To Vima, 
21 December 2008) – see also chapter 9 in this volume. 
5 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence, Verso, London - New 
York 2006. 
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But, more deeply, one of the things that went without saying, that the youth 
were expected to take for granted as a part of this tacit social contract, 
concerned life itself, not death. The definition of a good life, as implied in the 
framework of Greek cultural intimacy, consisted of the following scenario: 
live with your parents until you get a degree – get a good job – earn money – 
create a family – do consumption/shopping – have your kids live with you 
until they get a degree, and over again. 
 
With this movement, a large part of Greek – and also migrant – youth 
expressed an anxiety before the possibility not of missing this life style, but 
precisely of getting it: they declared that this is not what they perceive as a 
meaningful life, and that they are not willing to sacrifice all their vital energy 
in order just to achieve it.  
 
This refusal of the ‘family secret’ can only be beneficial, as it introduces into 
the public domain the possibility of a discussion. Instead for the logic of a self-
evident, tautological ‘one way’, it poses again the idea that several different 
answers are thinkable, even necessary, and that we need to reflect and 
politically decide which one to choose and how best to organise our 
common existence.  















Warped Institutions, Political Failure and Social Guilt  
Alexis Kalokerinos, Associate Professor, University of Crete, Greece  
 
As Ι write these lines, two months have passed since the killing of fifteen-
year-old Alexandros Grigoropoulos and the outbreak of riots in Athens and 
other Greek cities. Once the Christmas tree in the Greek capital’s 
Constitution Square had been set alight, the ‘uprising’ went on vacation, 
promising to return at the ‘pan-educational’ rally on 9 January 2009. That led 
to a number of demonstrations, and sit-ins at a number of schools and 
universities were resumed, but within approximately three weeks no 
educational institution remained under occupation. At the same time, 
terrorist organisations, claiming urban guerrilla status, have made sporadic 
appearances. Meanwhile, although European Union authorities have initiated 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EPD) against Greece and tough measures 
aimed at curbing the deficit are in the offing, the workers already suffering 
and expected to bear the brunt of the global financial crisis have not downed 
tools or taken to the streets.  
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Thus far, those who predicted that the murder of Grigoropoulos would 
spark off a new civil war in Greece have been proved wrong. The main 
tangible result of the ‘uprising’ on the political level has been a shift in power 
in the parliamentary left. The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) has 
lost approximately one third of the strength it had in opinion polls prior to 
the events, dropping to below 7% and behind the Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) which, in the midst of the crisis, made good of the opportunity to 
accuse the Coalition of ‘pandering to the anarchists’.  
 
To properly assess public opinion and the stance of the pupils and students 
who took part in the events, we need to bear in mind certain features of 
Greek society, its economy and institutions. Greece is characterised by a 
bloated public sector and a stunted, heavily state-dependent free market. The 
country’s productivity lag is reflected in its high balance of payments deficit 
(over 14% of GDP in 2008). The private sector is based mainly on activities 
generating instant return (construction, shipping and tourism). A large part 
of all economic activity (perhaps equalling 45% of the legitimate economy) is 
hidden and thus evades taxation, which mainly derives from waged labour. 
Society is organised along the lines of pressure groups, but trade unionism is 
controlled by the political parties and only attracts low participation rates. In 
sum, the political system has a peculiar stranglehold on what is a highly 
fragmented society. The ruling political class hands out public sector 
appointments and bargains with social groups over the granting of 
‘privileges’ and the selective implementation of laws on issues of concern to 
them. Public discourse is dominated by a left-leaning rhetoric that cuts 
across the entire political spectrum. Any attempt to alter the status quo is 
perceived as undermining public goods such as education and social security, 




In broad terms, Greek society is deeply ideologised in the 
Marxist/Althusserian sense, i.e., in terms of the distance between 
consciousness and practice. This was painfully apparent during the events of 
December 2008: politicians, intellectuals and ordinary people concurred that 
they had ‘deprived their children of their future’. The loudest voice at the 
time was the voice of guilt. The aforesaid admission would have been 
interesting had it not been of maximum idealistic content and minimum 
practical value. Not least because the very same society, though so prone to 
rhetorical mortification, had only recently failed to hold an effective dialogue 
on the irrational social security system, a question which hinges on the very 
issue of intergenerational solidarity. Similarly, society appears reluctant to 
enter into constructive dialogue over reforming the education system, which 
is one of the greatest failures of the contemporary Greek state.  
 
The Greek education system is geared in its entirety towards the 
‘panhellenic’ university entrance examinations, yet access to higher education 
is contingent on attending a parallel system of private crammers. In other 
words, the system suffers from what is in effect duplication. Pupils go 
through the motions of learning at state school and are then supposedly 
educated at private afternoon school, though in essence they are merely 
being drilled in specialist techniques to solve the riddles they are to face in 
the panhellenic exams. This perverse system lacks meaning, and when 
experienced by pupils merely provides them with additional reasons to 
demand personal free time: during the unrest in December 2008, pupils 
stayed away from school in the morning, but continued to attend afternoon 
lessons as normal.  
 
In turn, Greek universities are hidebound by obsessions and political 
manipulation. ‘Democratic rule’ within them is instituted via ‘co-
administration’ by academics and party-affiliated student union groups, 
whose support is required in electing university authorities. In practice, 
political parties in Greece use universities as a breeding ground for high 
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ranking officials. To attract young talent they offer legislated power in the 
form of ‘co-administration’. This recruitment scheme, which includes 
practical exercise in all kinds of negotiation, has proved effective for political 
parties but disastrous for universities. Composed in this manner, the 
university community is supposedly self-governing with regard to basic 
issues such as the free dissemination of ideas and the enforcement of laws 
from the outside world, including the non-use of physical violence on 
campus. 
 
On the fringes of this same system are those smaller groupings which refuse 
to participate in ‘co-administration’ but which, in accordance with their own 
interpretation of university democracy, are vociferous in demanding ‘all 
power to student assemblies’. Manifestations of the non-parliamentary left 
and part of the parliamentary left exploit the twisted logic inherent in the 
system. Since the non-use of violence on Greek university campuses is a 
matter of consent and self-regulation, they deny all others the right to 
regulate. Being opposed to the ‘system’ in general, the limits to this practice 
on and off campus are not easily discernible. By the same token, the violent 
so-called leftist activism that has grown up and spread from university 
institutions nationwide has its roots in fundamental structural flaws in the 
higher education system and its close ties to the political system, more 
particularly in the terms on which the former reproduces the latter.  
 
In conclusion, I believe that the December ‘uprising’ sprang from inherent 
structural distortions within basic social institutions which Greek society 
views with increasing mistrust. In other words, there is a particular 
substratum where one spark will suffice to ignite a wildfire at any moment in 
time. Of course, my approach is a circumscribed, selective one that focuses 
on idiosyncrasies as causes for the phenomenon. Yet any link to more 
general issues and wider environments should also bear in mind what 
Wilhelm Wundt termed the ‘heterogeny of purposes’. The potential spread 
of phenomena or the successive triggering of social behaviour via the dense, 
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centre-free neural network of contemporary humanity does not require a 
cohesive public and a succinct ‘message’. What movements ‘mean’ is often a 




















Saint Nicolas Night 
Antonis Karakousis, Editing Director, ‘To Vima’, Greece 
 
On that festive Saturday night of 6 December - the feast of Saint Nicholas - 
nothing forebode the storm that would follow. The weather was good, it was 
a big celebration, those celebrating were many and, as usual, Athens was at a 
standstill, the streets jammed with people going to the theatre, the cinema, 
clubs, bars, cafes.  
 
And then, a little before 9pm, an unforeseen and yet fateful event occurred. 
It only took an exchange of a few harsh words between some youths and 
police officers in Messologiou Street, in the flammable and for many years 
‘free’ district of Exarchia, to stir the blood and to lead a ‘macho’ police 
officer to raise his weapon and fire. As a result the first youth found in the 
path of the bullet was shot dead.  
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As soon as the news started spreading, between 9 and 10pm, that the youth 
Alexis Grigoropoulos had been shot dead by police fire, the atmosphere 
became electrified. Rapidly the news circulated to youth hangouts in central 
Athens and the suburbs, mainly via mobile phone and the Internet. In 
double quick time students began to congregate at the scene of the murder 
in Exarchia Square. 
 
Almost simultaneously, in the university buildings of central Athens, the 
Athens Law School, the Polytechnic, Panteio University and the Economic 
University of Athens, gatherings of enraged leftist, anti-establishment and 
anarchist groups, created a volatile atmosphere. Very soon, the rage felt 
against the police spilled-over into violence in the area around Exarchia and 
spread rapidly. From midnight onwards, violent episodes and clashes with 
the police multiplied; the destruction of shops and arson attacks became 
more generalised in the centre of Athens. 
 
That night, a great number of youths, seemingly with great ease as if they 
were prepared well in advance, broke all limits; they swore, threw rocks at 
the police, and the more aggressive among them did not hesitate to smash-
up and even burn shops and cars. Those who found themselves in the centre 
of Athens felt the tension and the climate of uncontrollable youth violence. 
The fateful, fatal event in Exarchia was reflected in the eyes of the 
youngsters and the uncontainable actions they took. It was characteristic of 
the great anger, the overflowing rage, that the major damage was caused in 
the traditional commercial centre of Athens, between Syntagma and 
Monastiraki Squares, by youths who were leaving the bars and clubs of the 
Psyri area.  
 
On Sunday morning Athens looked bombarded. However, the violence 
continued for days and spread across all big urban centres, from Crete and 
Peloponnese, to Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia. This was accompanied by 
student attacks on police stations. On Tuesday 9 December, the destruction 
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was even bigger and was accompanied by widespread looting whose 
perpetrators included groups of immigrants living in central Athens. 
 
Thus the youth explosion acquired a mass and panhellenic dimension. As 
this phenomenon unfolded, it afforded the opportunity to other extremist 
groups to be rejuvenated and organise more acts of violence and terrorism. 
It is not by chance that following the December 2008 events the successor 
terrorist groups to 17 November, ELA, and other organisations, were 
reformed or reborn. These groups were capable of, and often realised, 
coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets. Since then a number of 
intensely symbolic attacks have taken place against various targets, including 
banks, state owned organisations and political offices. 
 
All these events allowed many people to speak of a new social phenomenon, 
which others, especially other Europeans, associated with the international 
economic crisis, and saw it as a precursor to a wider social explosion that 
could be transmitted throughout and threaten Europe more generally.  
 
The death of young Grigoropoulos is not enough to explain the lengthy 
duration of the events and the intensity of the challenge. Those who follow 
closely Greek politics and the dynamics within the groups of Greek youths 
are aware of the historical undercurrent to the current events. Greece has a 
tradition of such clashes. In 1965, before the colonels’ Junta, we witnessed 
similar events. In the midst of palace intrigue, the monarchy’s interventions 
in Greek politics and the interference of para-state forces, radicalised 
elements of the Greek youth, distanced from the activity of the official left, 
and making reference to Che Guevara and the Cuban revolution, reacted in 
a similar fashion to the ‘July events’ (Iouliana). The koukouloforoi or ‘hoodies’ 
of that period also attacked the centre of Athens, clashed with the police, 
smashed shop windows and threw rocks cut from paving stones. 
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Athens was involved in that early phase of what became a bloody urban 
guerrilla movement in Europe. Supporters of Castro and Guevara planned 
the organisation of armed groups in Athens aimed at fighting against the 
police state and political persecution. These early activities were cut short by 
the military coup in April 1967, only to be repeated in about 1970, and to 
constitute the basis for the creation of extreme leftist revolutionary 
organisations directed against the junta. From within these sprang forth, 
during the Metapolitefsi, the groups of revolutionary violence such as ELA 
and 17 November. 
 
Since then there have always been hard core left and leftist cells within the 
universities and youth circles in general. At times they acquired the power to 
intervene in the political scene and at others they were marginalised: but they 
always sowed the seeds of doubt in the system as a whole.  
 
During the last 5-6 years this pre-existing leftist and anti-systemic movement 
has been reborn. It found international expression through the anti-
globalisation movement, it exploited the decline of ‘ideologicopolitics’ and 
the organisational demise of official political parties, it found strength in the 
failures of the education system and of widening inequality and high youth 
unemployment, and developed a particularly dynamic presence within 
universities. Anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian groups emerged on the 
basis of ideas and perceptions of autonomy in most Greek universities, 
comprising a powerful mechanism of contestation, outside from the control 
of the official left.  
 
The university sit-ins and occupations in the last few years and a lot of 
dynamic protests in the streets of Athens against the establishment of 
private universities are attributed to those groups. They drew, and draw, 
energy from the myths of May ’68 and they want to maintain the historical 
connection with the protest movement which emerged in 1979, when the 
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then conservative government of Georgios Rallis attempted to impose 
changes at the universities.  
 
These unique, autonomous and extra-parliamentary groups were flanked by 
anarchist and anti-establishment forces, with presence in Athenian 
neighbourhoods and influence on the marginalised and ‘lumpen’ sections of 
the Greek youth, which have flourished by their side in the last few years.  
 
Last December all the anti-systemic forces coincided and constituted a 
dynamic front of contestation, not only against the police and the 
government, but also against other perceived systemic forces and especially 
the media. The economic crisis reinforced their actions and rendered the 
anti-systemic and anti-capitalist message clearer and more readily 
transmittable to wider circles of youth. In other words the murder of Alexis 
Grigoropoulos in Exarchia functioned as fuse in an already volatile social 
stratum. 
 
In the months since those horrendous events, much has changed. The 
economic crisis is deepening and continuously affects more people; the state 
recedes and the politico-economic system is disputed; the credibility of 
politics is eroding; youth discontent simmers; crime rates are on the rise; the 
instances of political violence and terrorist actions have multiplied; fear and 
insecurity nestles for good in the minds and soul of many people; the police 
becomes continuously more aggressive, as do the media, and no one knows 
any longer what the next unforeseen and accidental event, like that of last 























Words Have Consequences  
Paschos Mandravelis, Journalist – Political Analyst, ‘I Kathimerini’, Greece 
 
‘Vandalism’ in Greek used to be quite a precise word. In dictionaries it was 
defined as the ‘intentional destruction of works of art’. ‘Vandalism’ now 
means the ‘deliberate destruction of everything’, even if that has no artistic 
value at all. It was probably the ire of owners that stretched the definition: 
They needed a stronger word to describe their misfortune and they stretched 
the word till they destroyed the signification. Today we don’t have a 
different word for the ‘deliberate destruction of works of art’. When all 
wilful destruction is ‘vandalism’, vandalism seizes to exist.  
 
The stretching of ‘vandalism’ does not stop here. Now it is the anger of the 
so-called ‘vandals’ that sunders the element of intentionality from the 
meaning of the word. I first encountered the double stretched word in 
Panteio University of Athens during a conference about the role of Mass 
Media during the December riots. When a speaker uttered the word 
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‘vandalism’ a student stood up and shouted ‘vandalism is not the uprising of 
the young, vandalism is the submission of youth’. Of course neither is 
‘vandalism’ but when stretching words becomes an acceptable practice, 
discussion becomes impossible. Moreover stretched words can be used as 
excuses for violent acts. 
 
Two of the vandalised words in Greek society are ‘violence’ and ‘power’. A 
long time ago, ‘violence’ only meant what we call today ‘physical violence’. 
In our postmodern public dialogue ‘violence’ is everywhere and every 
human contact can be tagged as a violent one. The state has the monopoly 
of violence, and this Weberian notion is stretched to the belief that every 
expression of governance is violent. Acrimonious speech is considered 
‘violent speech’. The educational system is ‘a relation of power between the 
instructor and pupils’, so it has elements of violence with in. Even cars exert 
violence – there was graffiti during December that prompted for ‘violence to 
the violence of cars’. 
 
Metaphorically speaking, cars do exert some kind of violence in our lives. 
But this metaphor, combined with the glint of postmodern pedagogy, 
becomes a literal scheme in the minds of young people. A lot of people take 
for granted that physical, psychological and metaphoric violence is the exact 
same thing. But, if everything is violence, physical violence is excused. When 
cars are considered violent, burning them is self-defence. Of course these 
postmodern schemes do not appeal to everyone, but on the other hand not 
everyone was burning and looting during the December riots in Athens. 
 
Edmund Burke’s ‘fourth estate’ was translated in Greek as the ‘fourth 
branch of government’. In the minds of people and (unfortunately) 
politicians mass media posses power equal or even bigger than the three 
traditional branches of government. Of course, speech in general has the 
power to shape beliefs. But even if we take for granted the metaphor that 
the ‘pen is mightier than the sword’, speech - even the most acrimonious – 
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does not physically hurt people and it is different from ‘violence’, as it used 
to be perceived. The mass media do not have a share in the monopoly of 
violence: they don’t make laws, they do not arrest people, and they don’t jail 
them. 
 
This is becoming less and less clear in Greek society. Speech is often 
described as violent and sometimes punished legally more harshly than real 
acts of physical violence, because in the mind of lawmakers ‘language has no 
bones, but it can break bones’. On the basis that violence is not only 
physical, but can also be psychological, free speech is restricted. On the 
other hand, when the press is considered as a branch of government, then it 
should be restricted in the way the three traditional branches are restricted. 
And indeed, there are several laws that restrict the media industry on the 
basis of their exercising power. 
 
When postmodernism meets bad translation, intellectuals and journalists 
should live in fear. One of the popular slogans chanted during the 
demonstrations was ‘violence to the violence of power’. If speech is violence 
and the media posses power, then in the mind of the ‘revolutionary’ the 
media, journalists and intellectuals become legitimate targets. And indeed 
they did. Small bombs were detonated at the front doors of writers and a 
new terrorist group opened fire aiming at the vans of a television station, 
saying that they attacked the ‘4th branch of government’, an ‘ally of the 
establishment’, because ‘journalism won the confidence of society 
pretending that it is against power but in reality climbed to be the first power 
in society’ and ‘media shape our everyday lives (...) so we become disciplined 
subjects. They manipulate our minds every single day so that we fill the 
reserve of our disciplined time with the values and faculties of the system’. 
 
If all this sounds nonsensical, we should take into consideration that it is the 
dominant rhetoric in Greece. Greece lives in a nebula of ill-defined 
concepts. Postmodernism prevails in the humanities; metaphorical speech is 
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taken literally not only by kids on the streets but by the high priests of the 
dominant leftist ideology. The destruction of meaning turns eventually into 
destruction of property and in the case of power symbols, like policemen, to 
the destruction of life.  
 
Of course the December riots were not just a big misunderstanding of 
concepts. They contained a lot of anger due to real problems. They had the 
frustration of a generation that believes that it has no future. Teachers and 
pupils deal with a heavily bureaucratic and ineffective educational system 
every day. Political scandals and the ineffectiveness of government played a 
role. All sociological explanations describe the big mess that Greece is in.  
 
What is different this time is the way this exasperation was expressed. The 
destruction of meaning also destroyed the political intervention of the 
December student rallies. When postmodernism hits the streets we have 
riots with no clear political demands. Moreover, many argued that the 
‘uprising didn’t need a specific statement of demands. What happened is a 
statement that something goes wrong’. But this is postmodernism with 















Facing up to the Culture of  Violence 
Manos Matsaganis, Associate Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business, 
Greece 
 
It is probablly too soon for a full understanding of what caused the events of 
December 2008. All I can offer is a random reflection on the state we in 
Greece find ourselves in, three months later. 
 
A policeman who uses his regulation firearm to kill (cold-bloodedly, 
according to most accounts) a 15-year old only because the latter shouted 
abuse at him is obviously an exceptional case. However, the sense of 
impunity of our security forces, and their perception that they are above the 
law, is the rule. Not all of them are murderers, certainly. But it is true that 
the police too often acts with gratuitous brutality (e.g., when dealing with 
foreign immigrants), that corruption in their ranks is too diffuse, and above 
all that violent and/or corrupt policemen can always count on the complicity 
of their colleagues and superiors, as on the ‘understanding’ of judges. 
Clearly, things are more complicated when there is a dead man (and as 
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young as that), but a way to transform a life sentence into a mere three-year 
imprisonment on appeal can always be found. It has happenned before (in 
the mid-1980s). Why think it will be different this time? 
 
The lack of trust in the willingness and the capacity of the high ranks of the 
security forces to punish the guilty and take all necessary measures to ensure 
that no such incidences happen again fits in the context of a more general 
lack of trust in institutions – all of them. A quick look at the front pages of 
our daily papers over the past two or three years leaves no doubt. Judges 
protecting organised crime. Priests, nay monks, moving around by helicopter 
(‘to save time’), clinching million euro deals (‘for the benefit of our 
monasteries’), keeping millions on offshore accounts. And, obviously, 
ministers who use state funds as if these were their private property. A moral 
degradation never seen before – and all in the reign of a prime minister who 
came to power with the promise to defeat powerful interests (or literally, 
with his characteristic elegance, ‘to beat the pimps’). 
 
To this cocktail, pretty explosive as it is, one ought to add the fact that for 
too many youths everyday life and future prospects are rather bleak. As 
shown by international comparisons, our teenagers study more and learn less 
than most of their European counterparts. Our best universities do a decent 
job in extremely adverse conditions, but are left little space to breath, 
squeezed as they are by a suffocating state beaurocracy intent on micro-
management of academic affairs on the one hand, and by the endemic 
contestation (often assuming violent forms) on the part of a minority of 
their students on the other hand. Youth unemployment is second only to 
certain lawless regions of the Italian South. The few who do have a job must 
come to terms with low wages and work insecurity. And, at the background, 
the asphyxiating presence of a hyper-protective family, which no longer 




Crucially, the difficult task of integrating one million recent immigrants (in a 
native population of 10 million) has been shamefully neglected. Their 
children spend most of their time in their own ethnically homogeneous 
neighborhoods in Athens and elsewhere. They go to local state schools, that 
are gradually abandoned by Greek kids as their families move out, and where 
they are taught basic numeracy and literacy by increasingly demoralised (and 
increasingly resigned) teachers. Outside school, in workplaces and in their 
dealings with the state, they face hostility or, at best, indifference. They have 
no faith in, and feel no loyalty to, the country that hosts them – and who can 
blame them? 
 
The above may help make sense of the intensity of so many adolescents’ 
reaction to the killing of a boy their age. But in order to explain the violence, 
the damage to banks, the looting of shops, as well as the destruction of state 
universities, public libraries and national theatres, one needs to turn 
elsewhere; beyond the repulsion of the middle classes, which might have 
been more convincing had they been less accustomed to evading taxes and 
ignoring rules when it suits them; and beyond the hollow words of our 
radicals, who christen ‘social revolt’ (and by implication, worth our respect) 
every act of blind and indiscriminate violence at the expense of universities, 
libraries, theatres and the rest of our public (and, incidentally, defenseless) 
cultural institutions. 
 
To explain the great number of youth committing acts of violence, and the 
even greater number of those tolerating such violence, one would have to 
tackle rather uncomfortable issues. Like the profound indifference (if not 
open complacence) of many Greeks with respect to the actions of the ‘17 
November’ terrorist group that was operative from the early 1970s to the 
beginning of the current decade. Like the spontaneous solidarity of an 
overwhelming majority of Greeks to the bloodiest regimes and leaders of 
our time (Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein and others), on the grounds 
that they stood up to the Americans. Like the silence of our trade unions, 
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and the lack of attention of our public opinion, to the victims (all foreign 
workers) of the many accidents at work caused by the reckless drive to 
complete the stadiums and supporting infrastructure in time for the 2004 
Athens Olympics. Like the tacit acceptance of, and the enthusiastic 
participation in, the collapse of the most elementary rules of civil coexistence 
that is the everyday chaos of motor traffic. Like the resignation of so many 
in front of the regular and perfectly organised clashes between rival football 
fans. 
 
Early responses to the crisis on the part of the political elite have often 
verged on overt or covert indulgence, of the ‘these-kids-have-good-reasons-
to-be-violent’ variety. This show of remorse is too shallow and insincere to 
be convincing. In any case, it will take much more than that for an exit from 
the current political crisis, just as the economic crisis begins to bite. The 
culture of violence is not easy to defeat, not by a polity that lacks the moral 
authority to combat it, nor in a society that refuses to acknowledge its 
existence. This time, no short cuts are on offer. As the saying goes, a crisis 
can be an opportunity to amend the bad old ways and make a fresh start. 














On the December Events 
Nicos Mouzelis, Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics, UK 
 
One cannot fully explain the massive mobilisation and the extent of 
violent/destructive acts during last December by mere reference to direct, 
obvious factors such as the fascist mentality of the policeman who killed 
Alexis Grigoropoulos, the brutality of some members of the security forces 
or the mismanagement of the crisis by the government. For a fuller 
explanation one will have to focus on a number of factors which are visible 
when one broadens the analytical framework; one will also have to show the 
way in which such factors are linked to each other and to the overall 
development of the crisis. 
 
The political and socioeconomic dimension  
Very briefly, starting from the political sphere, an important cause of the 
phenomena under investigation is the large-scale disorganisation of the 
police that the New Democracy government created (from 2004 onwards) 
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by placing its own people in key administrative positions. In addition to this 
type of clientelism, all post-1974 Greek governments are responsible for 
tolerating the continuous violent practices of a small number of anti-state, 
anarchically oriented groups. They are also responsible for failing to reshape 
the ‘asylon’ institution – an institution which was meant to protect academic 
freedom by preventing the police from entering university premises. Instead, 
by the misuse of the relevant regulations, the asylon was used (and is still 
used) by a small number of activists cum hooligans who periodically disrupt 
lectures, loot/destroy university property and promote criminal activities 
such as drug dealing. Finally within the political sphere one should take into 
account the large scale corruption and the uninterrupted series of scandals 
which led to the delegitimation of political elites and parties. 
 
As to the socio-economic dimension, the dominance of neo-liberal 
ideologies and policies from the 1980’s until the present economic crisis 
created huge inequalities and marginalised an important section of the 
population. This situation is felt more acutely by the young who experience 
high rates of unemployment or have to accept badly paid jobs and 
exploitative work conditions.  
 
The educational/psychocultural dimension 
The underfunding of education and research, the lamentable state of higher 
education, the failure of educational reforms, the government’s upgrading of 
non-state colleges, which devalues the standing of state universities, and the 
exorbitant amounts of money that parents have to spend if they want their 
children to undertake university studies – have all created an explosive state 
of resentment and indignation.  
 
One should add that the new generation also faces severe problems in a late 
modern/postmodern context – a context within which traditional codes, or 
early modern certainties/ideologies, have weakened creating a void that 
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young people are called to fill up. As Anthony Giddens has pointed out, 
today the young, who face a multitude of choices in all social spheres, not 
only have to choose within a given framework, they have to create that very 
framework. In other words they have to ‘create their own biography’. 
Unavoidably, this situation creates anxieties and existential dilemmas which 
are much more acute than those that previous generations had to face. 
 
Civil Society 
Needless to say one could lengthen the ‘list of causes’. The interesting 
problem however is to show how the factors mentioned above are linked to 
each other; in what ways do they constitute an integrated whole having its 
own logic and dynamic? I think that the civil society concept is very relevant 
here. It helps us to understand how the constellation of factors relates to the 
forms that social mobilisation took. More concretely, in societies with well 
functioning democratic institutions one always finds strong organisations 
(e.g., NGO’s or authorities really independent from the government) which 
operate between the state and citizens. We find, in other terms, a strong civil 
society which follows neither a party nor a market logic. Such a ‘third sector’ 
creates alternative ways of linking the social with the political. 
 
In Greece civil society is extremely weak. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the political system operates less as a party democracy and more as a 
‘partocratic democracy’. By partocracy I mean a system of rule within which 
the party logic penetrates all institutional spheres undermining their 
autonomy and their specific values. From the sphere of sports and the 
professions to that of art and the university, party considerations prevail. 
They weaken all non-party, non-clientelistic, civil society linkages between 
the citizen and the state. Within this context social discontent generates 
protests and mobilisations which have an unfocused, diffuse character. They 
do not produce strategies with positive outcomes for the social whole. 
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I think that the above helps us to better understand how the various causal 
factors that we have discussed are linked to the form that the protests have 
taken. For if the death of Alexis operated as a catalyst, the partocratic 
undermining of civil society explains the dead-end character of the ensuing 
mobilisations/riots. These led, on the one hand, to the familiar blind 
violence of anti-state groups, and on the other to more peaceful 
pupil/student demonstrations. In the former case we observe brainless, 
nihilistic practices which have been wrongly compared with May ’68. (The 
May ’68 events may not have changed the political system, but they have 
shaped to a great extent the social imagery of western societies). In the latter 
case, the relatively unformed, protean energies of a protesting youth were 
not channelled in a transformative manner. For neither the weak civil society 
nor the discredited parties could play such a constructive, channelling role. 
 
To conclude, as far as future developments are concerned, one cannot but 
be pessimistic. The anarchist violence will not disappear – on the contrary it 
will probably take more extreme, terrorist forms. As to the more peaceful 
and fully justified protests of the younger generation, these will continue; but 
they will lead neither to political nor to cultural changes. As long as the 
combination of a weak civil society and a strong partocracy prevails, there is 














Some Thoughts on the 2008 Riots in Greece 
George Pagoulatos, Associate Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business, 
Greece 
 
The December 2008 riots exploded before the global financial crisis had 
even begun to hit the ‘real’ economy and society of Greece. One can only 
imagine what the scope of vandalism and havoc could have been had the 
angry rioters also seen a family member or friend being laid off.  
 
We should neither overlook nor overstate the socio-economic causes of the 
December 2008 riots. As all complex phenomena, this too cannot be 
attributed to monocausal explanations. Any attempt to locate the causes at 
any single particular realm (be it socio-economic anxiety, labour market 
insecurity, the state of education, a culture of defiance to the rule of law, or a 
decline of social values and institutions), is misguided to the extent that all 
such factors have had their own role to play. And their relative impact 
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probably differed upon each of the particular subgroups involved in the 
riots.  
 
Thus any attempt to find the ‘real cause’ of the December 2008 revolt is 
misplaced by seeking to answer the wrong question. First of all, it was not 
exclusively a student revolt, though militant leftist and anarchist students 
were probably a principal constituent of the rioters that set Athens (and 
other cities) ablaze.  
 
Second, the revolt was both spontaneous (in that it formed an immediate 
reaction to the sudden police killing of a high-school student on the night of 
December 6) and organised, though in a decentralised manner. Hundreds or 
thousands of messages were sent over mobile phones and the internet 
calling for demonstrations and ‘revenge’ for the killing of Alexis. Various 
anarchist and militant leftist groups prepared and organised violent actions 
(burning, destroying and looting banks, shops and public buildings), seeking 
to incite social revolt against the state and the capitalist system. Then even 
more organised terrorist groupings took over, encouraged by an 
environment of state and police dysfunction, and generalised lawlessness.  
 
Third, the riots were the culmination of a long period of ‘social learning’ in 
repeated youth demonstrations (including prolonged occupation of schools 
and universities), that tended each time to stretch further and further the 
limits of lawlessness and impunity. Demonstrations were multiplied and 
radicalised during the massive student rallies of 2006-08, regularly 
culminating in vandalism and clashes of the most militant groups with the 
police. It was thus not the phenomenon as such but the fierce intensity and 
the massive scope of destructive violence that was unprecedented in the 
December 2008 riots.  
 
It would be foolish to ignore the socio-economic causes of societal anger 
and violence, even if it only concerns a limited minority. Anti-systemic 
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indignation is bred particularly in poorer neighbourhoods, fuelled by a sense 
of despair over socio-economic insecurity, corruption and party clientelism, 
and a generalised sense of institutional and ethical decline involving not just 
government but a significant part of the political system, the judicial system, 
the media, the business sector, the educational system, even the church. 
After a peak of national self-confidence following Greece’s adoption of the 
euro and the successful hosting of the 2004 Olympics, public confidence in 
democratic institutions and the country’s future has once again reached very 
low levels during the last couple of years.  
 
Yet the December riots were not an uprising of the downtrodden, a social 
revolt. Inequalities have risen in Greece over the last ten or twenty years, in 
that the distance of the highest incomes from the median income has 
increased. But the worse-off and the bottom quartile have also seen their 
situation improve. In fact, relative poverty as distance from the median 
income has not increased, and, in terms of real purchasing power, poverty 
has notably declined.  
 
Nonetheless, a sense of income decline and a middle class ‘squeeze’ has been 
widely felt (and much talked about) recently in society. This has much to do 
with the high rates of youth unemployment and low starting wages (the ‘700 
euro generation’), intensified competition and precariousness in the labour 
market, and dynamic upward but also downward mobility within the 
country’s huge middle class. It also has to do with the growing gap between 
expectations and capabilities, in a consumer society in which rapid growth of 
bank credit has fuelled (and to a significant extent helped realise) 
materialistic dreams of home ownership, a brand new car and more 
comfortable living. No wonder banks and luxury shops became prime-
targets of anti-capitalist raids during and after the December 2008 riots.  
 
Who were the hooded culprits behind the waves of violence, arson and 
destruction that ensued? Certainly not the thousands of high-school 
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students, who peacefully demonstrated their healthy anger and grief for the 
killing of their fellow teenager by an out-of-control, vigilante policeman. 
Hood-wearing youngsters from the affluent suburbs joined the poor and 
marginalised of the urban neighbourhoods, the anarchists, the lumpen 
hooligans, the drug addicts and the destitute immigrants in raiding stores and 
setting banks on fire. Many rushed to experience the unique rite of passage 
of real battle, throwing rocks and Molotov-cocktails at the police Special 
Forces. 
 
The great loser from the riots, and the new climate they have helped 
establish, is the culture of democratic dialogue, tolerance and pluralistic 
conciliation that was meant to prevail, especially in the universities. The 
brazen and systematic exploitation of the university asylum by violent 
extremists and vandals intolerant to opposite views has destroyed academic 
freedom, and torn apart the peace and normality that are vital for the 
survival and flourishing of any academic community. The defenders of the 
‘no-go’ sanction for the police under the institutionalised university asylum 
are now on the defensive, and so are the advocates of a permissive stance 
towards rebelled youths. The failure of the state apparatus to provide 
effective fundamental enforcement of the rule of law has created an image 
of state powerlessness which further emboldens violent, criminal and 
terrorist groups. At the same time, the widespread demand for effective 
police protection is boosting a powerful law-and-order agenda, which is 
picked up by populist politicians, journalists, charlatans, and various 
authoritarian and xenophobic elements in society. Such climate of 
polarisation could easily turn a poorly trained, demoralised police into a 
force of abusive vigilantism, further eroding the already problematic 
protection of civil rights, and widening the rift separating the marginalised 
youth from societal institutions. This could turn into a vicious social spiral in 














A More Mundane Reading of  the December 2008 Riots 
in Athens 
Dimitris Papadimitriou, Senior Lecturer, University of Manchester, UK  
 
The recent outburst of violence in Greece struck at the very heart of the 
Metapolitefsi consensus. The riots of December 2008, and their ongoing 
aftershocks, continue to ruffle feathers amongst Greece’s political elites. 
Over the past few months there has been no shortage of commentary about 
the rights and wrongs of what happened. Indeed much of the discussion has 
focused on the normative underpinnings/implications of violent protest in 
Greece. Less attention has been directed towards explaining its root causes.  
 
For the sympathisers of the ‘youth movement’, the sight of Athens burning 
was romanticised beyond any rationality. Demonstrators were publicly 
congratulated for having ‘woken up’, abandoning their Nintendos for 
baseball bats and Molotov cocktails. The ‘authoritarian Greek state’ and the 
‘corrupt order of the Metapolitefsi’ became enemy number one. This 
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depressing paternalism towards young people was often wrapped in a 
thousand clichés. Its common denominator: an absurdly uniform rejection 
of both modernity (e.g., globalisation) and tradition (e.g., the Christmas tree 
at Syntagma square!). Its banner: the glorification of ‘defeat’, the elevation of 
the underdog to the status of hero. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum those horrified by the disorder in the 
streets of Athens regarded the youth responsible as ‘outcasts’ that ‘needed to 
be taught a lesson’ (if only the government could teach this lesson!). Many 
attacked the attackers on grounds of political immaturity and lack of a clear 
agenda. As if rioting was a tidy, organised, enterprise. As if the heterogonous 
crowd that participated in these events could ever produce a well thought 
out agenda and a clear vision for the future. A quick look at the Greek 
revolution (or indeed the French or any other revolution) testifies to similar 
discrepancies. The outcome of revolutions (or more generally political 
violence) is always a million miles away from the demands and aspirations of 
those who initiated them. 
 
I am not making these parallels light-heartedly. I do not wish to attach to the 
events of December 2008 characteristics of a revolution. I am not sure I 
know what the term really means. Neither do I want to engage in moral 
relativism that does not distinguish between violence and non-violence. I, 
like many others, found the violence perpetrated by the protesters 
disturbing. I condemned them publicly in the same way that I continue to 
condemn the violence suffered by those who dare to speak out against them. 
Yet my personal dislike of the methods (and rhetoric) used during the recent 
events in Athens is in itself insufficient to explain why they took place in the 
first place. In our unanimous condemnation of the flawed methods of its 
expression, we should not abdicate from the ambition of explaining the 
reasons behind the youth’s disconnection from politics.  
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In my eyes, the root cause of the violence in Athens is not a reaction to the 
authoritarian nature of the Greek state or a generalised rejection of the 
Metapolitefsi consensus. Sure, certain parts of our political system are in need 
of urgent reform. I would personally single out the electoral law (ideally 
towards the introduction of closed party lists and the break up of large 
electoral districts) and party financing as top priorities. However, it is worth 
remembering that for all of its faults, the two-party system that formed the 
backbone of the post-Junta period is responsible for the longest spell of 
political stability and economic growth in the history of the country. 
Although too many incidents of police brutality (particularly against 
immigrants) go unpunished, I don’t believe that the Greek state is more 
authoritarian or intrusive than most European (or American) comparators. I 
also happen to believe that Greece today is not more corrupt than it was in 
the 1950s, the 1920s or indeed throughout the 19th century.  
 
What is often perceived in public imagination as generalised decay is, in my 
opinion, best understood as a series of (often interconnected) public policy 
failures that should be ‘unpacked’ and addressed in a sober and targeted 
manner. Let’s start from the incident that sparked the recent violence. The 
death of a young person in the hands of a trigger-happy policeman is 
indicative of a more generalised collapse in public service ethos that can be 
witnessed across the wider public sector in Greece. This incident has more 
to do with shockingly low levels of training and operational planning in the 
Greek police service than the re-emergence of a 1950s-style police-state. The 
underlying failure, however, lies elsewhere.  
 
Over the past 20 years, Greece has sustained one of the highest and most 
persistent levels of unemployment in the EU. High unemployment has 
depressed wages and has consistently eaten away the dignity and sense of 
achievement of young people. The desperate search for jobs has also fuelled 
the monster of clientelism which has now consumed both the public and 
(increasingly) the private sectors. The increasing irrelevance of our 
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educational system (at all levels) has certainly exacerbated the demand side 
of the unemployment equation. Its failure to remain free, even at the 
secondary level, has also (justifiably) created a mounting sense of injustice.  
 
Why have these failures persisted? People often forget that during the past 
20 years there have been numerous attempts to reform Greece’s educational 
system and labour market. All of them carried with them significant political 
costs. Ask Mr. Kontogiannopoulos, Mr. Arsenis, Mr. Giannitsis and Mrs. 
Giannakou. All of them are no longer members of the Greek parliament. 
Our concern should, therefore, be directed, not towards the system’s ability 
to initiate reforms, but rather on its capacity to deliver reforms and, most 
importantly, to deliver reforms that work. To succeed in the first objective 
our society as a whole needs to reconsider its often indefensible 
predisposition towards the defence of the status quo. As regards the second 
objective, our system of governance has yet to develop the resources that 
will enable it to articulate complex policy problems and seek their solution. 
This is both an institutional and cultural shortcoming, but needs not to be 
seen as a fatal flaw of our current political order. It is for this reason that I 
support the Metapolitefsi consensus and I object to the burning down of 















A Glimpse from the Future – But What Sort of  Future? 
Antonis D. Papagiannides, EU affairs counsel to the ADNPA, Greece 
 
When – soon after the social unrest/youth explosion in Athens, then the 
aftershocks in the regions – President Nicolas Sarkozy was reportedly 
worried by the risk of contagion throughout Europe, one could trace a 
curious feeling in a large segment of the Greek media. It was part wonder, 
part ‘suits them right’, part even pride at Greece serving as some sort of dark 
(or, rather, flaming) avant-garde in turning everyday-life tensions, a deeply 
ingrained and widespread feeling of inequality, a sense of ever-diminishing 
expectations, into a wave of riots.  
 
The very fact that the Sarkozy fears were expressed at an EU Summit, (also 
that French reforms in the field of education were soon afterwards put on 
the back-burner), added to the positive assessment of the December 2008 
events. Without going all the way and considering these events as a re-run of 
the May ’68 Paris riots, with all the political and society-changing 
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consequences they had over the decades that followed, the welling-up of 
anger and frustration, the destruction of property at the hands of groups of 
‘hoodies’ and the play with fire in front of (generally approving) 
demonstrating crowds, the engaging of the police in open fighting in the 
streets – all such aspects of the days of anger were viewed with fascination. 
Deeper meanings were sought. Slogans and images from the riots were 
integrated in public debate; they tended to crowd out all other news from 
front pages of newspapers and prime-time TV news bulletins. Political 
consequences came to be hotly debated; a Cabinet reshuffle and a radical re-
direction of government economic policies resulted largely from these events. 
 
If we visit one of the most articulate pamphlets-cum-website-support of 
these days (REVOLT, the paper published by the Athens School of 
Economics/ASOEE), we find an attempt at building a theoretical 
framework for the riots. 
 
‘The tradition of oppression teaches us that the situation we live in is in no 
way an exception – it constitutes the rule. We should understand history in a 
way adapted to this reality (Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of 
History). Today, the city is subject to a continuous change in symbols and 
meanings. Streets that used to link forms of coercion, now link expressions 
of anger and refusals to submit. The Christmas Tree[6] instead of serving as a 
symbol of a dead festivity now serves as a (burnt-down) symbol of the 
festivities organised by the living […]’. 
‘We are here, we are everywhere! We are a glimpse from the future. 
Tomorrow we will witness a new dawn where nothing will be certain. And 
what could be more liberating after so many years of certainties? One 
bullet[7] was enough to cut the unyielding continuity of days that were so 
identical to each other […] Those who want to understand, will understand. 
Now is the time to throw open the cells that shut each one of us in his/her 
miserable life’.  
 
                                              
6 Traditionally decorating Constitution Square, opposite the Parliament building; the 
Athens Christmas Tree was burnt down one December evening – from then on, riot 
police stood guard around it, with demonstrators regularly dancing around a sort of 
‘farandole’ and showering both policemen and the Tree with garbage, including pig heads 
from the meat market. 
7 From the gun of a policeman, who shot and killed a 15-year old schoolboy, thus sparking 
the December riots. 
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It would be quite instructive to read this text – or any other of the 
contributions of the self-styled anarchists and insurgents during those days 
of anger – in tandem with the diagnosis of, say, The Economist of the same 
period. 
 
‘There is something weird and frightening about the sight of a modestly 
prosperous European country that is suddenly griped by an urban uprising 
that the authorities cannot contain […] the incident that sparked Greece’s 
mayhem – the killing by police of a teenager – could have happened almost 
anywhere. And there are many cities where an angry minority is ready to run 
amok: think of Budapest in 2006, Paris in 2005. But in the Greek case a 
spasm of rage among youngsters and the bohemian underworld has laid bare 
a deeper seam of discontent: with corruption, maladministration and the 
sheer frustration at the bottom of the Athenian pile […] In health, schooling 
and other public services, bad state provision fuels a huge under-the-counter 
market, creating in turn vested interests opposed to any change. Life is tough 
for youngsters with energy and talent but no cash or connections […] Of 
course; none of this excuses the riots. Indeed, many of the policies (such as 
reinforcing the ban on private education) that are advocated by self 
appointed representatives of Greece’s angry young people would make their 
problems worse’. 
 
A point missed – or consciously left aside – by two so differing analyses is 
that, contrary to what happened in France with the revolt of the ‘banlieues’, 
the riots in Greece (both in Athens and in the regions) tended to involve and 
cater to lower-middle and middle-class youths, while the crowds of 
demonstrators and/or bystanders was also largely of the same profile. Even 
a smattering of the upper-middle class was involved (such being surely the 
recruiting ground of demonstrators in front of the Greek embassies in 
London or Washington). This, in turn, translates into the profile of the 
political after-effects of the riots, as they were internalised by the hopelessly 
ineffective Greek political system. 
 
A further point that should in no way be missed is the way in which the 
police, who were used to contain the riots, not only proved largely 
incompetent, but were visibly overwhelmed by the rioting crowds, even 
openly ridiculed by teenagers. When, following a change in Government 
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lines of command, the police tried a tougher stance, they soon slid to over-
reaction (e.g., arresting en masse civil-rights activists and lawyers) thus 
further alienating public opinion. 
 
If one were to shift the field of vision from mid-December to mid-February, 
just five or six weeks later, what does one see? Quite unpleasant things. A 
policeman standing guard in front of the Ministry for Culture was shot at 
and severely wounded, as was a mini-bus full of policemen. Then, a series of 
terrorist attacks or, at least, terror-inducing attacks took place. They ranged 
from the beating-up of a respected left-wing criminologist, Yannis 
Panoussis, who was participating in a seminar about the reintegrating of ex-
convicts into society, to armed attacks against police headquarters, on a TV 
station and, eventually, to a high-power-explosive car bomb parked in front 
of a Citigroup bank building. 
 
Arguably, the lethal intent of such attacks differed widely: the beating-up of 
Panoussis was explained away as a slip-up (senior judges attending the same 
seminar were to have been the real targets). The attacks on police stations 
and on media buildings were victimless (but verbal threats for future lethal 
attacks on journalists and ‘using TV technicians for boxing training 
purposes’ during demonstrations formed the core of a leaflet left 
afterwards). A car bomb that echoed Middle East urban warfare didn’t go 
off (but the threat of massive use of force was very close under the surface). 
The torching of nine Metro carriages added further confusion. 
 
As these lines are being written, a troubling element is sinking in: all these 
terrorist manifestations, following so soon after the December ‘Merry Crisis 
and a Happy New Fear’ events, openly try and link up with the youth 
explosion and the wide-ranging social unrest. If indeed, the December 















Greece, December 2008: A Tragedy in the Waiting 
Helena Smith, Athens-based correspondent for ‘The Guardian and The Observer’, UK 
 
YEARS may pass and we will still be debating what it was that started off 
the spasm of violence that gripped Greece in the month that ended 2008. 
 
As I write, much of the media is awash with talk of how best to tackle the 
‘hooded ones,’ or koukouloforoi, those so widely blamed for the country’s 
worst civil disturbances in decades. 
 
The rise in criminality, the resurgence of terrorist activity, the renewed 
vigour with which protestors are taking to the streets (including, most 
recently, the children of immigrants born in Greece), are all, in some way, 
seen as offshoots of the explosion that erupted in December. Just like the 
riot police, who so regularly stand guard on street corners, the flak-jacketed 
officers who now patrol Athens’ boulevards and commercial districts, and 
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the graffiti of dissent that like some bad epidemic has spread from wall to 
wall, pillar to pillar around the capital. 
 
Irrespective of political leaning, Greeks agree that post-December 08 they 
live in a country that is much less secure. And most, starting with the young, 
also accept that it is one that could quite easily erupt again. The embers are 
there: all it will take, they say, is a spark and the inferno will reignite because 
the dry wood, the kindling that will send the flames shooting high, has yet to 
be cleared. 
 
This belief is based not so much on ideology, or discontent with the ruling 
conservatives, or indeed the financial tsunami that, propelled by the global 
economic crisis, is expected to hit Greece in the coming months (although in 
a nation where one fifth already live under the poverty line that will surely 
exacerbate social strains). But rather on the knowledge that so much of the 
state apparatus, the levers of power that govern daily existence, are ossified, 
corrupt and rotten to the core. 
 
If the December insurrection laid one thing bare, it is the contempt Greeks 
hold for a system whose institutions are so widely distrusted and whose 
political and ecclesiastical elite have come to rely almost solely on graft, 
cronyism and nepotistic connections. Thirty five years after the restoration 
of democracy this archaic state of affairs has bred frustration and despair. 
 
It took one bullet to start the riots but once fired it was that dissatisfaction – 
the Weltschmerz born of that despair - which drove so many onto the streets. 
 
From the Baltics to the Balkans, countries have been rocked by revolt, with 
many of those protests also inspired by anger at the impact of globalised 
capitalism, rising economic inequality and post-modern malaise. 
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But while the Athenian uprising can lay legitimate claim to being the first 
riots against the ‘cult of greed’, Greeks, perhaps more than any other 
European nation are also acutely aware of - and driven by - their history, 
with the vestiges of the 1946-49 civil war, the bitter divide between left and 
right, never far from the surface of social and political life. 
 
Leftists talk of a ‘red thread’ that runs through Greek history; one that 
connects the anti-Nazi resistance with the events that ushered in the collapse 
of military rule in 1974 – the November 1973 student occupation of the 
Athens Polytechnic being at their epicentre – to the eruption of the riots in 
December. 
 
The generations raised in the shadow of the revolt that was so brutally 
crushed at the Polytechnic see it as a ‘passing of the relay baton’, a duty 
almost, to oppose the establishment and, more especially, that hated symbol 
of authority: the police. 
 
When Epaminondas Korkoneas, the special guard seconded to the police, 
shot dead Alexis Grigoropoulos, a tousle-haired schoolboy at approximately 
9 PM on December 6th, the wave of revulsion that it rapidly triggered shone 
a bright light not only on the sentiment nearly all Greeks share – disdain for 
authority – but the length to which the state is also prepared to tolerate civil 
unrest in the wake of military dictatorship. 
 
The power of the Polytechnic as a defining moment in Modern Greek 
history – its legacy as a call to arms almost – soon became apparent when, 
within hours of Korkoneas pulling the trigger, thousands gathered in 
Exarchia. Had it not been for the psychic pull of the Polytechnic – and the 
controversial, if hallowed piece of post-Polytechnic legislation obstructing 
police intervention on the campuses of educational institutions – the riots 
may well have run out of steam, or at best have been an overnight affair. 
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Instead, young protesters seeking refuge behind the gates of the Polytechnic 
were able to create an operations base, one in which they could make petrol 
bombs, sledgehammer marble slabs into stones and take cover from the 
police. 
 
Similarly, scenes of rampaging youths lobbing rocks and petrol bombs at 
shops, banks, cars, hotels and even homes, may never have occurred if a 
conservative government, in power with a wafer-thin majority of one, had 
not been so fearful (or mindful), of the associations with right-wing 
authoritarianism that a clampdown might have elicited. 
 
Greece instead was allowed to descend into chaos with the Interior Minister 
himself, insisting on the defensive stance taken by riot police, as properties 
nationwide were attacked, burned and looted. For the anti-establishment 
movement and other nihilists (including the country’s not inarticulate and 
increasingly well-connected anarchist groups), this was the moment they had 
been waiting for. 
 
To say that the riots were the sole endeavour of the notorious koukouloforoi, 
or student protestors enraged by the fatal shooting of 15-year old 
Grigoropoulos (an incident that Greece’s children were fast to identify with), 
would be facile and wrong. 
 
In the wake of the reintroduction of democracy, generations of Greeks have 
been raised on a diet of bad news: a succession of scandals in a system 
neither known for its meritocracy nor willing to punish the perpetrators of 
such infringements of justice. 
 
Middle class kids – disconnected youth frustrated by their perceived lack of 
prospects – unemployed youngsters and even those lucky enough to have a 
job but, by and large, earning little more than 700 Euros a month, all felt 
drawn to the ‘uprising’ because they saw this as their moment: their time to 
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vent pent-up rage, to protest against the ills of a society that since 
democracy’s return has disappointed so many. 
 
With no one agent behind the insurrection, the protests may have seemed 
directionless and with no formal demands – beyond the perennial calls for 
the improvement of Greece’s shambolic education system, desire for police 
to disarm and, in this case, request for the government to step down. 
 
Indeed, that might be why, so far, they have failed to morph into an 
organised movement of civil unrest. 
 
But perhaps that was not the point. 
 
Perhaps the point was in the rebellion itself – an uprising that simply said 
‘eimaste parontes’ – ‘we are here’. And watch out! We are not going to go 
away. 
 
Whatever, the spasm of violence that gripped Greece in the month that 















December’s Unquiet Dreams 
If I cannot move Heaven, I will raise hell (Virgil) 
Foteini Tsalikoglou, Professor, Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences, 
Greece 
 
If frustration leads to aggression, a well-known hypothesis in psychology, 
then the uprising of Greece’s youth in December 2008 was bound to 
happen. In hindsight, it is hardly surprising that a mass of youth should 
flood the streets in what was to develop into an unprecedented uprising – in 
numbers, duration and in the constantly renewed, often technological 
inventiveness of its participants – with the death of a 15-year-old triggering 
strong identification mechanisms (‘it could have been me’). The tip of an 
iceberg floating in dark waters, the unique characteristics of these riots seem 
to foreshadow the emergence of new collective identities in Greek society. 
The causes are manifold:  
 
 64 
Political crisis. The Greek political scene is dominated by scandals, corruption, 
impunity, widespread distrust of all institutions, and a culture of lawlessness, 
in which the distinction between what is legitimate and what is not has 
become increasingly obscure. The dominant attitude can best be summed up 
by the words of a former government minister: ‘A legal deed is also a moral 
one.’  
 
Economic crisis. The Greek economy is in sharp decline, threatening 
employment, salaries, and pensions. For the first time since the Second 
World War, an entire generation is deprived of the hope of leading a better 
life than that of their parents. A bleak future is the only certainty in a climate 
of ever-increasing uncertainty.  
 
Educational crisis. With a system of ‘free’ education that is anything but free 
and the privatisation of higher education on the horizon, state universities 
are in decline. Unemployment among the youth now stands at 17%. 
Graduates entering the market are faced with the bleak prospect of the so-
called ‘generation of the 700 Euros’, while two out of three will land a job 
that bears no relation at all to their subject of study. 
 
It is in such a climate, nurtured by the all-enveloping individualist bias, that 
the events of December took place, forcing upon us the question: ‘Who are 
these youths and what do they want?’ 
 
But which youths in particular does the question refer to? Falling back to a 
general category labelled ‘youth per se’ is disorienting, if not deliberately 
misleading. One should rather talk about an array of different groups 
stemming from various family and class backgrounds, embedded in 
different, and sometimes conflicting ideologies and value systems – groups 
differentiated according to their psychological and social make-up, their 
representation of self and other, their status as students or workers, their 
social and ethnic background, and the degree of social exclusion they are 
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subject to. Indeed, the main fact that distinguishes these riots may well be 
the radical heterogeneity of the participants. The crowd consisted of 
youngsters from privileged suburbs in the north and impoverished areas in 
the west, children of jobless parents, economic refugees in abject poverty, 
activists committed to violence, hooligans, anarchists, agents provocateurs, and 
all kinds of ‘hood-wearers’ (koukouloforoi), who concealed their identity with a 
balaclava out of conviction or simply for protection.  
 
This list is not exhaustive, and the categories are provisional and 
overlapping, suggesting as they do the presence of youth groups in all their 
known and unknown, formal and informal versions. However, for a brief 
period in December 2008, dividing lines seemed to disappear: a widely 
disparate horde of youths gathered together spontaneously and swarmed the 
streets of Athens and other cities. This is the main reason why the public 
debate on youth cannot replace youth’s own discourse. What do the 
December events mean to them? The question is inextricably linked to what 
it means to be a youth today and needs to be explored in far greater depth 
than is currently the case.  
 
The notions of identity and identification and the forms of their internal 
articulation are far from being obvious. For a psychologist there are some 
crucial questions to be raised regarding the issue of self-representation: how 
do different youths perceive themselves? How do they picture themselves in 
the future? What is the relationship between self-image and ‘reality image’? 
How does their violent behaviour relate to depression as a hidden but potent 
force? How do anger, despair, frustration, and repressed desires shape their 
mode of being? And how are these complex issues shaped in turn by the 
current political and economic conditions? 
 
To answer such complex questions new modes of approach and 
comprehensive tools need to be explored in addition to conventional ones 
(in-depth interviews, discourse analysis, etc.). If the December events served 
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as a process of ‘awakening’, the same may be true in respect to the 
awakening of scientific thought as it faces the meaning of being young today 
and, by extension, the meaning of thinking about phenomena one can only 
partially identify with.  
 
A social phenomenon manifests itself not only through the causes that 
generated it but also through the second-round social reactions that it 
provoked. The ‘secondary’ often emerges as ‘primary’. Reactions to 
December’s riots can be classified into a legitimising discourse (‘they have 
good reasons’; ‘something good will come out of this, a new awareness’; ‘the 
“couch” generation is waking up’); a moderate discourse (‘yes, but...’; ‘we 
understand, but this is going too far’); and a denouncing, delegitimizing 
discourse (‘they are troublemakers, criminals, and a threat to our 
democracy’).  
 
The delegitimizing discourse is found in societies that are based on 
‘uncertainty avoidance’ and put a high premium on legality, orderliness, and 
clarity. 
 
It makes use of the distorting mechanism of ‘psychologising’, which reduces 
complex social phenomena to simplistic ‘psychological’ labels. For example, 
its exponents stigmatised the protestors as ‘dangerous’ and ‘immature’, and 
criticised those who expressed legitimising or moderate views with personal 
remarks like ‘guilt-ridden’ and ‘middle-aged’. Psychologising obscures the 
tensions that are inherent in a situation, focusing instead on the apparent 
psychological characteristics of the people involved. Such a discourse is not 
accidental, nor is it the result of a momentary lapse of reason in an attempt 
to grasp the reality of the situation. Psychologising is an actual strategy used 
by its exponents to ensure conformity to the status quo, with the ultimate 
aim of resisting change.  
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The issues raised by the December riots are open-ended and reach far 
beyond any ideologically bound point of view. Were the riots an intense but 
essentially short-lived uprising or do they have a future? Do they bear any 
relation to the terrorist attacks that continue to scourge the country? To 
what extent do the latter lead to a biased re-interpretation of December’s 
events, thereby reinforcing the deadlock reached by delegitimizing 
discourses?  
 
We should also consider the issue of state violence: minors who are 
prosecuted on the basis of anti-terrorist laws; protestors who are severely 
injured by the use of chemicals and tear gas; residents in the city centre with 
heart and respiratory problems. What is the fate of ‘objective’ media 
information in such a sentimentally loaded context?  
 
The December riots brought to light only one aspect of violence. There is 
also an invisible and more insidious form of violence that is detrimental to 
mental health, and that is internalised violence – violence that is targeted not 
against the other, but against the self. In terms of the frustration-aggression 
model, depression and self-destruction are masked forms of aggression 
turned against the self when there is no outlet for frustration. This violence 
hardly appears out in the streets. It surreptitiously cripples life itself and is a 















The Riots of  December: A Spontaneous Social 
Phenomenon or a Social Movement? 
Persa Zeri, Professor, Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences, Greece 
 
According to the German sociologist and social movement expert Dieter 
Rucht ‘what can happen and will happen is determined to some extent by 
the past. A deep embodiment and a very slow change of mentalities and 
cultural patterns define the frame of future possibilities. It is therefore 
important to look back into the past if one wants to anticipate the 
potentiality and the probability of future developments’.8 On the basis of 
these remarks, I shall try to broadly outline the social and political 
background of the 2008 riots in Greece. 
 
                                              
8 Text of a lecture with the title ‘Anstöße für den Wandel- Soziale Bewegungen im 21. 
Jahrhundert’ (Impulses for a Change - Social Movements in 21st Century), Berlin, 2 May 
2002, p. 1. 
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To start with, we should stress the unusual intensity of the riots (involving 
mainly university students and high school pupils), their long duration and 
extent throughout the country, but also the broad range of the forms of 
action after the killing of a teenager by the police. Had the death of the 
youth not taken place, such an escalation would not have been possible.  
 
In Greece, where family bonds are particularly tight and emotional, this 
absolute outrage sent the whole of society reeling with sympathy, grief and 
rage. While the government and the police put up with large scale havoc and 
wrecking, the rioters had a clear field for many days; political parties tried to 
take advantage of the situation and organised nine demonstrations in three 
days.  
 
In this context, the position of the left-wing party, ‘SYRIZA’, gave the 
impression that it tolerates or even supports the brute violence of the rioters.  
The December riots laid bare the scale of a profound social and political 
crisis. In the 1990s, the dominant model of development was based on the 
strong position of the financial sector, tourism and the improvement of the 
infrastructure through construction activities. Little importance was given to 
the promotion of productivity, competitiveness, investment in knowledge 
and innovation, reform of the educational system and employment; the 
impact of which in a time of an international economic crisis multiplies the 
impasses of Greek society. At the dawn of the 21st century, medium-sized 
companies and small-scale economic activities dominate the economic 
structure, affecting the state.9 Particular interest groups penetrate the state 
and influence voting attitudes. The system is full of ‘veto-players’ who raise 
obstacles to attempts at reform. Scandals, corruption and discontent are the 
order of the day and have led to a complete lack of trust in politicians. 
 
                                              
9 Tassos Giannitsis (ed.), In a Search of a Greek Development Model, Athens 2007, 120ff. 
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Moreover the fixation on the state is a central element of Greek political 
culture. After Greece’s transition to democracy in the mid-1970s, a 
dominance of politics vis-à-vis society was established; of parties as opposed 
to alternative political forms, of the party leader as opposed to the party 
organisation. The parties determine the functioning of every formal or 
informal social and political institution. The predominance of party politics 
favoured clientelism and strongly restricted the representation of collective 
interests in associations as well as the development of autonomous social 
groups. It is only to be expected that the prevailing values in the society are 
those of distrust, lack of solidarity, indifference to common interest issues, 
and contempt of the law. Greeks in their majority (two thirds according to a 
European social research)10 are the most distrustful people among their 
fellow citizens in Europe. Traditional structures of family and 
neighbourhood constitute an obstacle for the development of an interest for 
participation in social organisations. In a time of high unemployment, young 
people seeking employment depend on family connections with politicians 
and entrepreneurs when they try to find a job. The frustration due to lack of 
perspectives is deeply-rooted. 
 
What seems to be a fatal element of political culture today is the mistrust of 
society in state institutions, an attitude having its origins in the resistance 
against the German occupation during Second World War and against the 
military junta of 1967 to 1974. The problem is that the difference between a 
dictatorial power and a democratic state of law is not acknowledged in 
society nowadays, irrespective of the ineffectiveness of democratic 
institutions. Any violent action against the state can often be accepted by the 
people whatever its content. The first murders by the terrorist organisation 
17 November are still viewed as actions of civil disobedience.11 Moreover, 
this distrust in state institutions is combined with a mentality of ‘getting away 
                                              
10 Politics – Society – Citizens, A European Social Research, edited by the National Centre for 
Social Research, Athens 2007, p.279 (in Greek). 
11 G. Auernheimer, ‘Proteste in Griechenland’, Südost-Europa, 4/2008, pp.9 ff. 
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with it’ (e.g., illegal buildings, traffic offences, wrecking of public property by 
rioters). The students arrested for vandalism during the violent 
demonstrations of recent years were acquitted after the concerted support of 
parents, professors, the media and politicians.  
 
The violent forms of protest by the students against the upgrading of the 
status of private colleges of higher education and the killing of the teenager 
by the police have been combined in the last months with the destruction of 
teaching rooms, offices and electronic equipment. All this happened under 
cover of an anachronistic asylum regulation forbidding the police to enter 
the university premises. Toleration of this vandalism by the left-wing 
professors association occurs in the context of a network of illicit 
transactions between student party organisations, left-wing professors, civil 
servants and the university heads. The university protesters reject any change 
at a time when Greek universities are in dire need of radical reforms, and 
youth unemployment in the age bracket of 15 to 24 years has risen to 28%. 
 
The riots of the high school pupils after the killing of the teenager were, to a 
certain extent, a manifestation of their frustration with an educational system 
which imposes an enormous burden on them, disproportionate to its results, 
and leaves them unhappy with their life situation. In addition, the Greek 
educational system does not encourage critical and analytical thinking; 
instead, it lurches from the pillar of a strong formalised education (learning 
by heart, private tutorial centres, etc.,) to the post of traditional ideologies 
(orthodoxy, Hellenism, the nation, etc.).12 It was only reasonable, therefore, 
that in the school pupils’ actions of protest one could hardly discern 
concrete demands of social change or any organisational patterns. The 
uprising has already subsided. The rebellion of university students and 
school pupils of last December was a spontaneous collective social 
phenomenon which did not have the characteristics of a social movement in 
                                              
12 Ibid., p.11. 
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the form of systematic actions of groups and organisations aiming at social 
change by means of protests, and the articulation of social or political 
alternatives. 
 
In the last few days, an after effect of the December riots is a widespread 
atmosphere of fear provoked by the attacks of anarchist students against 
professors, the occupations of public theatres accompanied by looting, while 
the police and the representatives of state institutions stay absent. New 
terrorist groups threaten with mass killings and destructions. This is the 
culmination of a cultural, political and social crisis. 
 

